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Recently, we proposed a simultaneous quantum and classical communication (SQCC) protocol,
where random numbers for quantum key distribution (QKD) and bits for classical communication
are encoded on the same weak coherent pulse, and decoded by the same coherent receiver. Such a
scheme could be appealing in practice since a single coherent communication system can be used for
multiple purposes. However, previous studies show that the SQCC protocol can only tolerate very
small phase noise. This makes it incompatible with the coherent communication scheme using a
true local oscillator (LO), which presents a relatively high phase noise due to the fact that the signal
and the LO are generated from two independent lasers. In this paper, we improve the phase noise
tolerance of the SQCC scheme using a true LO by adopting a refined noise model where phase noises
originated from different sources are treated differently: on one hand, phase noise associated with the
coherent receiver may be regarded as trusted noise, since the detector can be calibrated locally and
the photon statistics of the detected signals can be determined from the measurement results; on the
other hand, phase noise due to the instability of fiber interferometers may be regarded as untrusted
noise, since its randomness (from the adversary’s point to view) is hard to justify. Simulation results
show the tolerable phase noise in this refined noise model is significantly higher than that in the
previous study where all the phase noises are assumed to be untrusted. We conduct an experiment
to show the required phase stability can be achieved in a coherent communication system using a
true LO. a
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two remote
parties, traditionally called Alice and Bob, to generate
a secure key through an insecure quantum channel fully
controlled by an adversary (Eve) [1–6]. The secure key
can be further applied in other cryptographic protocols
to enhance communication security.
One of the major roadblocks in the wide adoption
of QKD is the high cost: dedicated communication in-
frastructures (such as dark fibers) and expensive devices
(such as single photon detectors), are commonly required
in today’s commercial QKD systems. It is thus im-
perative to come up with cost-effective QKD solutions.
∗ qib1@ornl.gov
† elelimc@nus.edu.sg
a This manuscript has been authored by UT-Battelle, LLC un-
der Contract No. DE-AC05-00OR22725 with the U.S. Depart-
ment of Energy. The United States Government retains and the
publisher, by accepting the article for publication, acknowledges
that the United States Government retains a non-exclusive, paid-
up, irrevocable, world-wide license to publish or reproduce the
published form of this manuscript, or allow others to do so, for
United States Government purposes. The Department of En-
ergy will provide public access to these results of federally spon-
sored research in accordance with the DOE Public Access Plan
(http://energy.gov/downloads/doe-public-access-plan).
Recently, in light of the similarity between continuous-
variable (CV) QKD based on coherent detection [7] and
classical coherent communication, we proposed a simul-
taneous quantum and classical communication (SQCC)
protocol where Gaussian distributed random numbers for
QKD and bits for classical communication are encoded
on the same weak coherent pulse, and decoded by the
same coherent receiver [8]. Since a single coherent com-
munication system can be used for both classical com-
munication and QKD, it can effectively reduce the cost
of QKD itself.
However, previous studies show the SQCC protocol
can only tolerate very small phase noise [8]. This is
mainly due to the cross-talk between the QKD signal and
classical communication signal: on one hand, the random
QKD signal appears as an additional noise source in the
classical communication. To ensure the classical bit error
rate (BER) is below a given threshold, a larger modula-
tion amplitude of the classical signal would be required
comparing with the case of conducting classical commu-
nication alone. On the other hand, since the QKD signal
is superimposed on the classical signal, the variance of
excess noise due to phase fluctuation is proportional to
the power of the classical signal. A larger modulation
amplitude of the classical signal will result in a higher
excess noise in QKD, hence resulting in a poorer per-
formance. To achieve high-performance classical com-
munication and QKD at the same time, the tolerable
2phase noise variance is less than 10−4rad2 in the previous
study [8]. Experimentally, phase noise below 10−4rad2
has been demonstrated in CV-QKD experiments using a
distributed local oscillator (LO), where the LO for coher-
ent detection is generated from Alice’s signal laser and
distributed to Bob through an insecure quantum channel
[9–13]. However, it could be difficult to achieve such a
small phase noise in CV-QKD using a true LO, where
the LO is generated by Bob using an independent laser
source. Note that CV-QKD using a true LO is very ap-
pealing in practice due to its simple design and enhanced
security [14–18].
Can we relax the requirement of very low phase noise in
the SQCC protocol? In QKD, Alice and Bob can quan-
tify the information gained by Eve from the observed
noise and other system parameters: a higher noise level
implies more information gained by Eve thus a lower se-
cure key rate. One conservative approach to deal with
noise in QKD is to assume all the observed noises are due
to Eve’s attack. This approach may overestimate Eve’s
information since practical QKD systems present intrin-
sic noises not necessarily controllable by Eve. An alter-
native approach is to assume that certain intrinsic noises
well protected from Eve are trusted in the security proof.
This approach can typically lead to a better QKD per-
formance. For example, the trusted detector noise model
has been widely adopted in long-distance CV-QKD ex-
periments [7, 9–12, 19]. More recently, the trusted source
noise model has also been studied in CV-QKD [20–24].
In this paper, we improve the phase noise tolerance of
the SQCC scheme using a true LO by adopting a refined
noise model where phase noises originated from differ-
ent sources are treated differently: on one hand, phase
noise associated with the coherent receiver may be re-
garded as trusted noise, since the detector can be cali-
brated locally and the photon statistics of the detected
signals can be determined from the measurement results.
This is consistent with the commonly adopted assump-
tion of trusted detector noise in practical CV-QKD; on
the other hand, phase noise due to the instability of fiber
interferometers are regarded as untrusted noise, since its
randomness (from Eve’s point to view) is hard to justify.
We conduct numerical simulations of the SQCC protocol
using a true LO based on the above noise model. Simula-
tion results show the tolerable phase noise in this refined
noise model is significantly higher than that in the pre-
vious study where all the phase noise are assumed to be
untrusted. Based on a design proposed in [25], we con-
duct an experiment to show the required phase stability
can be achieved in a coherent communication system us-
ing a true LO generated at Bob’s end. Our findings sug-
gest that the SQCC protocol could be a viable solution
in practice.
This paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we
present details of the SQCC protocol based on conju-
gate homodyne detection. In Section III, we develop the
noise model of the SQCC using a true LO, and present
simulation results based on practical system parameters.
In Section IV, we conduct an experiment to show the
required phase stability can be achieved in a coherent
communication system using a true LO. Finally, we con-
clude this paper with a discussion in Section V.
II. PROTOCOLS
The QKD protocol adpoted in this paper is the
Gaussian-modulated coherent states (GMCS) protocol
[7] based on conjugate homodyne detection [26]. We
further assume that the QKD protocol is implemented
with a true LO generated by Bob, as proposed in [14].
Since conjugate homodyne detection allows Bob to mea-
sure both the X-quadrature and the P-quadrature simul-
taneously, we adopt the quadrature phase shift keying
(QPSK) modulation for classical communication. This
is quantitatively different from [8], where binary phase
shift keying modulation is used for classical communica-
tion.
A. Classical QPSK scheme
In QPSK, Alice encodes two classical bits, mA and nA,
into the X-quadrature and the P-quadrature of a coherent
state, given by
|ψ〉 = |(e−imApi + ie−inApi)α)〉 (1)
where α is assumed to be a real number. The average
photon number µ of the coherent state |ψ〉 is given by
µ = 2α2.
Bob measures both the X-quadrature and the P-
quadrature of the incoming signal and uses the signs of
the measurement results to decode mA and nA, i.e., if
the measured quadrature value is positive (negative), the
corresponding classical bit is assigned as “0” (“1”).
B. The GMCS QKD based on conjugate
homodyne detection
In GMCS QKD based on conjugate homodyne detec-
tion [26], Alice prepares a coherent state |xA+ipA〉, where
xA and pA are Gaussian random numbers with zero mean
and a variance of VAN0. Here N0 = 1/4 denotes the
shot-noise variance. In this paper, all the noise vari-
ances are defined in the shot-noise unit. At Bob’s end,
he performs conjugate homodyne detection to measure
both X and P quadratures simultaneously. After repeat-
ing the above quantum state transmission and detection
process many times, Alice and Bob perform data post-
processing. Through an authenticated classical channel,
Alice and Bob compare a subset of their data to esti-
mate the transmission efficiency and the noise variance
for each quadrature. If the observed noise is below a
certain threshold, Alice and Bob can further work out a
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FIG. 1: Phase space representations of various coherent
communication schemes. (a) Classical QPSK scheme.
(b) The GMCS QKD scheme. (c) The SQCC protocol.
The figures on the right show the probability
distributions of X-quadrature measurement.
secure key by performing reconciliation and privacy am-
plification. See more details in Section III.
C. The SQCC protocol
In the SQCC protocol, Alice encodes her classical bits
{mA, nA} and Gaussian random numbers {xA, pA} on a
coherent state |(xA + e−imApiα) + i(pA + e−inApiα)〉 and
transmits it to Bob, who performs conjugate homodyne
detection to measure both X and P quadratures simulta-
neously.
Bob determines the classical bits {mB, nB} from the
signs of his measurement results {xR, pR}: if xR(pR) > 0,
then the bit value of mB(nB) is assigned as “0”. Other-
wise, the bit value is assigned as “1”. To decode Alice’s
random numbers for QKD, Bob processes his measure-
ment results using on the overall transmittance Tη and
the classical bits {mB, nB} determined above:
xB =
√
2
Tη
xR + (2mB − 1)α
pB =
√
2
Tη
pR + (2nB − 1)α (2)
where T is the channel transmittance, η is the detector
efficiency, and the factor
√
2 is due to conjugate homo-
dyne detection.
Alice and Bob can further perform data post-
processing and work out a secure key from raw keys
{xA, xB} and {pA, pB}, just as in the case of conven-
tional GMCS QKD [7]. The phase-space representations
of the above three protocols are shown in Fig. 1.
D. CV-QKD using a true LO
In all protocols discussed above, an LO is needed in
coherent detection. In most existing implementations of
CV-QKD, to reduce the phase noise, both the signal and
the LO are generated by Alice from the same laser and
sent through the insecure quantum channel [7, 9–13, 19].
This arrangement, however, may allow Eve to launch so-
phisticated attacks by manipulating the LO [27–31]. It
also requires complicated multiplexing and demultiplex-
ing schemes to effectively separate the strong LO from
the weak quantum signal at the receiver’s end. To solve
the above problems, CV-QKD using a true LO generated
at Bob’s side has been developed [14, 15]. The scheme
presented in [14] works as follows: for each transmission,
Alice sends out both a quantum signal and a phase refer-
ence pulse generated from the same laser. The quantum
signal carries Alice’s random numbers, while the phase
reference pulse is not modulated. At Bob’s end, he per-
forms conjugate homodyne detection on both the quan-
tum signal and the phase reference pulse using two sepa-
rate LOs generated from his own LO laser. The measure-
ment results from the phase reference pulse are used to
recover the phase relation φ between the two lasers. Us-
ing this phase information Bob can classically correct his
measurement results of the quantum signal in the post-
processing stage by performing the following rotation
x′R = xRcosφ− pRsinφ
p′R = xRsinφ+ pRcosφ. (3)
Various schemes have been proposed to implement CV
QKD using a true LO. In Ref. [14], the QKD signal
and the phase reference pulse are generated by using
an amplitude modulator to modulate the outptut of a
continuous-wave (cw) laser twice, as shown in Fig. 2(a).
Two LO pulses are generated from Bob’s laser in the
same way. Given Bob’s detector noise is much smaller
than the shot noise, the main phase noise of this scheme
can be estimated by [14]
σ =
∆t
τ1
+
∆t
τ2
+
2N0
ηnref
(4)
4 
FIG. 2: Two different ways to generate phase reference
pulses in CV-QKD using a true LO. (a) The QKD
signal (S) and the phase reference pulse (R) are
generated from a continuous-wave laser by using an
amplitude modulator (AM) [14]. (b) The QKD signal
and the phase reference pulse are split from a common
laser pulse using a path-unbalanced interferometer [25].
where ∆t is the time delay between the signal pulse and
the phase reference pulse, τ1 (τ2) is the coherent time
of the signal (LO) laser, and nref is the average photon
number of the phase reference pulse at Bob’s side.
We define σB =
2N0
ηnref
. It represents the shot-noise
contribution, and in principle can be suppressed by using
a strong phase reference pulse. The first two terms on
the RHS of (4) are fundamental phase noises associated
with the finite linewidth of the lasers, which could be
reduced by decreasing the time delay ∆t or using lasers
with longer coherent time (narrower linewidth).
In [25], Marie and Alle´aume proposed a modified
scheme where the signal pulse and the phase reference
pulse are split from a common pulse using a path-
unbalanced interferometer, as shown in Fig. 2(b). Since
this scheme can effectively remove the phase noise con-
tributed by the lasers, the residual phase noise is mainly
determined by the last term on the RHS of (4) and the
phase instability of the path-unbalanced interferometers.
We adopt this modified scheme in this paper.
III. NOISE ANALYSIS
The performance of the SQCC protocol depends on the
noises presented in the system. In this Section, we first
present the noise model adopted in this paper, followed
by calculations of the BER in classical communication,
the secure key rate in QKD, and simulation results based
on realistic parameters.
A. Noise model
The main noise sources considered here are: 1) phase
noise in a coherent communication system using a true
LO; 2) noise εle due to the leakage from the phase refer-
ence pulse to the signal; 3) detector noise denoted by υel;
4) signal-independent noise ε0 from channel and other
unidentified or unprotected sources; and 5) vacuum noise.
All the noises are assumed to be Gaussian, and we use the
same symbol to represent both the noise and its variance.
In this paper, we adopt the trusted detector noise
model by assuming both the detector efficiency η and de-
tector noise υel are well calibrated and out of Eve’s con-
trol. In contrast, items 2) and 4) are untrusted noises and
contributed to Eve’s attack. Item 1) is more complicated
and can be further separated into two terms: the phase
noise σI due to the instability of the path-unbalanced
interferometers (see Fig. 2(b)), and the phase noise σB
given by the last term on the RHS of (4). As discussed in
[25], previous experimental demonstrations of CV-QKD
using a distributed LO have shown that phase noise σI
associated with the path-unbalanced interferometers can
be very small. For example, phase noises in the order
of 10−4 ∼ 10−5rad2 have been demonstrated in [9, 12].
In comparison, phase noise σB is typically much higher
(10−3rad2 to be shown in this paper).
One crucial assumption we make in this paper is that
the phase noise σB is trusted. Since σB is determined by
the detector and the photon number of the phase refer-
ence pulse received by Bob, to justify this assumption in
practice, Bob may need to calibrate the detector and the
phase reference pulse in the QKD process 1. The detector
calibration is also required in the trusted detector noise
model and has been studied previously [30]. Here we
present a brief discussion on the calibration of the pho-
ton number of the phase reference pulse. As discussed
1 In [32], the authors discuss an interesting attack in CV QKD
using a true LO where Eve intentionally increases the photon
numebr of the phase reference pulse receievd by Bob. She could
achieve this by conveying the phase refence pulse from Alice to
Bob using a lossless channel. If Alice and Bob blindly apply the
trusted phase noise model without monitoring the photon num-
ber of the phase reference pulse at Bob, they may overestimate
the amount of trusted phase noise, and leave room for Eve to hide
her attack on the quantum signal. Of course, this attack won’t
work if Alice and Bob assume all the phase noises are untrusted,
as in [14, 15].
5in Section II D, to determine the phase relation between
the LO laser and the signal laser, Bob performs conjugate
homodyne detetcion to measure both the X-quadrature
and P-quadrature of the phase reference pulse. From his
measurent results, Bob can also determine the photon
statistice of phase reference pulses since classically the
quantity z = X2 + Y 2 is propotional to the intensity of
the phase refrence pulse [33]. So, the same measurement
device for the LO phase recovery can also be used for
phase reference pulse calibration. Given the finite photon
number of the phase reference pulse, the corresponding
phase noise is essentially originated from vacuum noise,
which is truly random to both the QKD users and Eve.
We thus assume σB as trusted noise.
Can we assume the phase noise σI is also trusted? At
first sight, since Eve cannot access the QKD system, it
seems reasonable to assume that σI cannot be manipu-
lated by Eve. However, the unpredictability of this noise
(from Eve’s point of view) is hard to justify. If there are
some internal patterns of the inteferometer phase drift
which are ignored by QKD users but known by Eve, she
may compensate this phase drift when the signal prop-
agates through the channel and thus reduce the phase
noise. In the mean time, she can attack the quantum sig-
nal to gain information at the cost of introducing noise.
If the total noise (including the reduced phased noise and
the noise due to Eve’s attack) equals to the phase noise
expected by the users (when Eve does not compensate
the phase drift in the channel), Eve’s attack cannot be
detected. For this reason, we assume σI is untrusted.
The term εle quantifies the noise due to the leakage
from the phase reference pulse to the signal. Since the
effect of leakage is implementation-specific, we conduct a
detailed analysis in Appendix A based on the design to
be presented in Section IV, where both time multiplex-
ing and polarization multiplexing are employed to reduce
the leakage. As shown in Appendix A, the excess noise
contributed by the leakage referred to the input of the
channel is given by
εle =
nref∆t
TN0τc
× 10− ξA10 × 10− ξP10 , (5)
where ∆t is the time delay between the signal pulse and
the phase reference pulse, τc is the coherent time of Al-
ice’s laser, and ξA and ξP are the extinction ratios (in dB)
of the amplitude modulator and the polarization multi-
plexing scheme.
From (5), the excess noise εle can be effectively sup-
pressed by improving the extinction ratio ξA or ξP . While
amplitude modulators with 65dB extinction ratio have
been demonstrated experimentally [34] and applied in
CV-QKD experiment [35], most standard commercial
products can achieve an extinction ratio in the range
of 20 to 50dB. In the simulation below, we assume an
extinction ratio of 30dB for both amplitude modulation
and polarization multiplexing.
B. Bit error rate in classical communication
In the SQCC protocol, the Gaussian modulation for
QKD appears as a Gaussian noise for classical communi-
cation. Furthermore, the contribution of phase noises is
proportional to the power of classical signal and can be
described by
α2
N0
(σI + σB). The overall noise variance at
the receiver’s end is given by
Ntot =
1
2
Tη[VA + εle + ε0 +
α2
N0
(σI + σB)]
+1 + υel,
(6)
where the factor 1
2
is due to conjugate homodyne detec-
tion, since the received signal is split by Bob into two
using a symmetric beam splitter.
We assume the channel between Alice and Bob is tele-
com fiber with an attenuation coefficient of γ, which is
assumed to be 0.2 dB/km. The channel transmittance is
given by
T = 10
−γL
10 (7)
where L is the fiber length in kilometers.
Given the signals transmitted by Alice are described
by Eq. (1), the BER of the classical QPSK is given by
CBER =
1
2
erfc(
√
Tηα√
4NtotN0
) (8)
where erfc(·) denotes the complementary error function.
To achieve a BER of CBER in the classical communi-
cation, the required displacement α can be determined
from Eqs. (6)–(8) as
α = w
√
Tη(VA + εle + ε0) + 2 + 2υel√
Tη(2− 4w2σI − 4w2σB)
(9)
where w is defined as
w = erf−1(1− 2CBER). (10)
Here erf−1(·) is the inverse error function.
We remark that to achieve a BER of 10−9 in classical
communication, the maximum tolerable phase noise is
σI + σB = 0.0278. This is determined from Eq. (9) by
requiring the denominator to be a real number.
C. Secure key rate in QKD
The asymptotic secure key rate of QKD, in the case of
reverse reconciliation, is given by Refs. [9, 36]
R = fIAB − χBE , (11)
where IAB is the Shannon mutual information between
Alice and Bob; f is the efficiency of the reconciliation
algorithm; χBE is the Holevo bound between Eve and
Bob.
6As we have discussed above, we assume detector noise
υel and phase noise σB are trusted, while phase noise
σI , excess noise due to leakage εle and channel noise ε0
are untrusted. Under this noise model, in the case of
conjugate homodyne detection, the detector-added noise
referred to Bob’s input is given by
χhet = (2 + 2υel)/η − 1 + TεB (12)
where εB quantifies the excess noise due to the trusted
phase noise referred to the channel input:
εB = (
α2
N0
+ VA)σB. (13)
The total channel-added noise (including all the un-
trusted noise) referred to the channel input is given by
χline =
1
T
− 1 + εle + ε0 + εI + 4α
2
N0
CBER (14)
where εI quantifies the excess noise due to untrusted
phase noise and is given by εI = (
α2
N0
+VA)σI ; The term
4α2
N0
CBER quantifies the excess noise contributed by the
BER in classical communication.
The overall noise referred to the channel input is given
by
χtot = χline +
χhet
T
. (15)
Since both quadratures are used for secure key gener-
ation, the mutual information between Alice and Bob is
given by
IAB = log2
VA + 1+ χtot
1 + χtot
. (16)
The Holevo bound of the information between Eve and
Bob is given by Ref. [9]
χBE =
2∑
i=1
G
(
λi − 1
2
)
−
5∑
i=3
G
(
λi − 1
2
)
, (17)
where G(x) = (x+ 1)log2(x+ 1)− xlog2x
λ21,2 =
1
2
[
A±
√
A2 − 4B
]
(18)
where
A = V 2(1 − 2T ) + 2T + T 2(V + χline)2 (19)
B = T 2(V χline + 1)
2 (20)
λ23,4 =
1
2
[
C ±
√
C2 − 4D
]
(21)
where
C =
1
(T (V + χtot))2
[Aχ2het +B + 1 + 2χhet
(V
√
B + T (V + χline)) + 2T (V
2 − 1)]
(22)
D =
(
V +
√
Bχhet
T (V + χtot)
)2
(23)
λ5 = 1. (24)
D. Simulation results
We conduct numerical simulations of the secure key
rate of QKD under the constrain of 10−9 BER in the clas-
sical communication. Other simulation parameters are:
γ = 0.2 dB/km, ε0 = 0.01, υel = 0.1, η = 0.5, f = 0.95,
∆t = 50ns, τc = 1µs, ξA = ξP = 30dB, and nref = 1000.
At each distance, the channel transmittance T can be
determined using (7). From (9) and (10), given T and
CBER = 10
−9, the displacement α is determined by VA
and other system parameters. So the only free param-
eter needs to be optimized is the modulation variance
VA. We numerically optimize VA at each distance to
achieve the maximum secure key rate. Secure key rates
are calculated at 4 different phase noise combinations:
1) σI = 10
−5, σB = 10
−3; 2) σI = 10
−5, σB = 10
−2; 3)
σI = 10
−4, σB = 10
−3; and 4) σI = 10
−4, σB = 10
−2.
Fig. 3 shows the simulation results. As a comparison, we
also calculate the secure key rate under the assumption
that phase noise σB is untrusted. Using the same sys-
tem parameters, no secure key can be generated at any
distance.
IV. PHASE NOISE MEASUREMENT
We conduct an experiment to determine the phase
noise in a coherent comuunication system using a true
LO based on the phase receovery shceme proposed in
[25]. A similar experiment has also been conducted re-
cently by Wang, et al., [37].
The experimental setup is shown in Fig. 4. Two com-
mercial frequency-stabilized cw lasers at telecom wave-
length (Clarity-NLL-1542-HP from Wavelength Refer-
ence) are employed as the signal laser and the LO laser.
Both lasers are operated at free-running mode with no
optical or electrical connections between them. Two
LiNbO3 waveguide amplitude modulators (EOSpace) are
used to generate 10ns laser pulses at a repetition rate of
10MHz. At Alice’s side, a polarization-maintaining fiber
interferometer with a time-delay unbalance of 46.9ns is
employed to generate a phase-related pulse pair (signal
and phase reference) from each incoming pulse. A spe-
cially designed bias-free amplitude and phase modula-
tor (APM in Fig. 4) is placed inside the interferometer
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FIG. 3: Simulation results of secure key rate under the
constraint of 10−9 BER in the classical communication.
Simulation parameters: γ = 0.2 dB/km, ε0 = 0.01,
υel = 0.1, η = 0.5, f = 0.95, ∆t = 50ns, τc = 1µs,
ξA = ξP = 30dB, and nref = 1000. The modulation
variance VA is numerically optimized at each fiber
length. The four curves presented correspond to the
following phase noise combinations: (1)
σI = 10
−5, σB = 10
−3; (2) σI = 10
−5, σB = 10
−2; (3)
σI = 10
−4, σB = 10
−3; and (4) σI = 10
−4, σB = 10
−2.
As a comparison, using the above system parameters,
no secure key can be generated at any distance if phase
noise σB is untrusted.
to control the amplitude and phase of the signal pulse.
Details of its design is presented in Fig. 5. Note the
signal pulse and the phase reference pulse are coupled
into orthogonal polarization modes by using a polariza-
tion beam combiner (PBC1 in Fig. 4). Such a design
can improve the isolation between the two pulses. Both
the signal pulse and the phase reference pulse propagate
through a spool of 25km single mode fiber. At Bob’s
end, a commercial 90o optical hybrid (Optoplex) and
two 350 MHz balanced amplified photodetectors (Thor-
labs) are employed to measure both X-quadrature and
P-quadrature of the two pulses from Alice. The two LOs
used in the coherent detection are split from a common
pulse generated by the LO laser. A tunable optical delay
line (TDL in Fig. 4) is placed inside Bob’s interferome-
ter to match its time delay difference with that of Alice’s
interferometer. By adjusting two polarization controllers
(PC2 and PC3 in Fig. 4), the intensity of each LO pulse
can be adjusted individually. Similar to the signal pulse
and the reference pulse from Alice, the two LO pulses
are also coupled into orthogonal polarization modes by a
polarization beam combiner (PBC2 in Fig. 4). Another
polarization controller (PC1 in Fig. 4) is used to match
FIG. 4: Experimental setup. S-signal laser; L-LO laser;
AM1,2-amplitude modulator; APM-amplitude and
phase modulator (see details in Fig. 5); PMB-90:10
polarization maintaining fiber beam splitter; BS-50:50
single mode fiber beam splitter; TDL-tunable optical
delay line; PBC1,2-polarization beam combiner; PC1−3-
polarization controller; Att.-tunable optical attenuator;
AWG-arbitrary waveform generator; BD-balanced
photodetector; ADC-analog-to-digital converter.
the polarization of Alice’s pulse with that of the corre-
sponding LO. Finally, the outputs of the two balanced
photodetectors are sampled by a 12-bit data acquisition
board (Texas Instruments).
In high-speed QKD, LiNbO3 waveguide modulators
are commonly employed to implement amplitude and/or
phase modulation. The bias voltage control is vital for
an amplitude modulator since its bias point commonly
drifts with time. Here, we achieve bias-free amplitude
and phase modulation by placing a phase modulator
asymmetrically inside a loop interferometer, as shown in
Fig. 5. See a simialr scheme in [38]. The basic idea
is to introduce different phase shifts on lights traveling
through the loop clock-wisely (CW pulse) or counter-
clock-wisely (CCW pulse). Note, depending on the in-
put optical signal (cw or pulsed) and the waveform of
the electrical control signal on the phase modulator, this
device can act as either an optical pulse generator, or an
amplitude and phase modulator. When the input is cw
light, each control pulse on the phase modulator will gen-
erate a pair of output light pulses with a time delay given
by ∆t = n(L2−L1)/c, where (L2−L1)/2 is the offset of
the phase modulator from the middle point of the loop
interferometer (which is about 1.8m is our experiment),
n is the refractive index of optical fiber, and c is the speed
of light in vacuum (see details in Fig. 5(a)). The tem-
poral width of the output optical pulse is determined by
the width of the control signal. When the input is pulsed
light, bias-free amplitude and phase modulation can be
achieved by controlling the waveform of the control sig-
nal to the phase modulator, as shown in Fig. 5(b). This
design can be useful in other applications beyond QKD.
In this experiment, we simply use it to adjust the photon
number of signal.
In CV-QKD using a true LO [14], the measurement
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FIG. 5: Bias-free amplitude and phase modulator.
BS-50:50 polarization maintaining fiber beam splitter;
PM-phase modulator; CW-clockwise;
CCW-counterclockwise. (a)When the input is cw light,
the setup can act as a pulse generator; (b) When the
input is pulsed light, the setup can act as an amplitude
and phase modulator.
results of the phase reference pulse (Xref , Pref ) are used
to determine the phase difference between the signal laser
and the LO laser using the relation
φ = −tan−1 Pref
Xref
. (25)
Once φ has been determined, Bob can correct his mea-
surement results of the signal pulse by using (3). Here
we want to determine the phase noise of the above pro-
cess. More specifically, we want to quantify the difference
between the φ estimated by Bob and the true value of
the phase difference φtru between the two lasers when
the signal is measured. To acquire a precise estimation
of φtru, we replace Alice’s signals for the SQCC proto-
col QKD by strong (unmodulated) calibration pulses. In
fact, to minimize the measurement noise associated with
the calibration pulse, their intensity is even stronger than
that of the phase reference pulse. In this experiment, we
define the weak pulse going through the path with an
amplitude and phase modulator (see Fig. 4) as the phase
reference pulse, and the strong pulse going through the
other path as the calibration pulse. We remark that no
information is encoded in this experiment.
From the measurement results of the calibration pulse
(Xc, Pc), we calculate
φtru = −tan−1 Pc
Xc
. (26)
The phase error is defined as φ − φtru. Exper-
imentally, the variance of φ − φtru has been deter-
mined to be 2.4±0.4×10−3rad2 (when the average pho-
ton number of the phase reference pulse is 103), and
0.79±0.25×10−3rad2 (when the average photon number
of the phase reference pulse is 104). From Fig. 3, this
phase noise is low enough to implement the SQCC pro-
tocol over practical distances.
V. DISCUSSION
CV-QKD based on optical coherent detection is ap-
pealing in practice since it can be implemented with stan-
dard telecommunication technology [39]. The research
in CV-QKD is also aligned with the resurgence of clas-
sical optical coherent communication, which is the most
promising solution to the dramatic growth of global com-
munication traffic [40]. Studies in this paper show it is
feasible to use the same coherent communication system
to conduct both QKD and classical communication si-
multaneously, as long as the distance is within the reach
of QKD.
To improve phase noise tolerance of the SQCC proto-
col and make it compatible with the CV-QKD scheme
using a true LO, in this paper we adopt a refined noise
model where phase noise due to finite photon number of
the phase reference pulse and the detector imperfection
is assumed to be trusted. Systematic noise analysis has
been conducted. Simulation results show that the tolera-
ble phase noise in this refined noise model is significantly
higher than that in previous studies [8]. Experimentally,
using a design proposed in Ref. [25], we demonstrated
the required phase stability can be achieved in practice.
While the results presented in this paper are encour-
aging, further researches are needed to bring this tech-
nology into real life. As we have shown in this paper, a
trusted noise model could significantly improve the QKD
performance. However, it could also introduce potential
security loopholes if Eve has a way to manipulate the
phase noise, or the QKD users overestimate the amount
of trusted phase noise. It is thus important to imple-
ment local calibration systems at both Alice and Bob to
monitor the relevant noises in real time.
We thanks the anonymous reviewers for their impor-
tant comments on the trusted noise model and the noise
associated with the leakage of the phase reference pulses.
This work was performed at Oak Ridge National Lab-
oratory (ORNL), operated by UT-Battelle for the U.S.
Department of Energy under Contract No. DE-AC05-
00OR22725. The authors acknowledge support from
ORNL Laboratory Directed Research and Development
Program. CCW Lim acknowledges support from MOE
AcRF grant R-263-000-C78-133/731.
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FIG. 6: Leakage from the phase reference pulse to the
signal pulse due to the finite extinction ratio. R-phase
reference pulse; S-signal pulse; ∆t-time delay introduced
by the path-unbalanced interferometer.
Appendix A: Leakage from phase reference pulse
In this Appendix, we study the leakage from the phase
reference pulse to the signal based on the specific design
presented in Section IV.
As shown in Fig. 4, Alice generates laser pulses from a
cw laser source by using an optical amplitude modulator.
Each laser pulse is further split into two (phase reference
pulse and signal pulse) by using a path-unbalanced inter-
ferometer. The signal and the reference are coupled into
orthogonal polarization modes to improve the isolation
between them.
In practice, only finite extinction ratio can be achieved
in both amplitude modulation and polarization multi-
plexing. So there will be unavoidable leakage from the
phase reference pulse to the signal pulse, as highlighted
in Fig. 6.
Given the average photon number of the phase ref-
erence pulse at Bob’s end is nref , the average photon
number of the leakage at Alice’s end is determined by
nle =
nref
T
× 10−ξA10 × 10− ξP10 , (A1)
where ξA and ξP are the extinction ratios (in dB) of the
amplitude modulator and the polarization multiplexing
scheme, correspondingly.
If the leakage photon has a fixed phase relation with
the phase reference pulse, then it only introduces a con-
stant displacement in phase space, which can be deter-
mined from Bob’s measurement results and removed in
the post-processing stage [10]. When taking into account
the phase noise of the QKD system and the finite coher-
ent time of the signal laser, the excess noise contributed
by the leakage can be described by
εle =
nle
2N0
σle, (A2)
where σle quantifies the phase noise of the leakage.
In our setup, σle is mainly determined by the coherent
time τc of the laser. Note the phase reference pulse and
the leakage are emitted at different times (with a time de-
lay of ∆t) by Alice’s laser. The spontaneous emitted pho-
tons generated within the above time interval contribute
a fundamental phase noise with a variance of 2∆t/τc. As
shown in [14], the coherent time of our laser is about 1
µs. If ∆t is about 50ns (see Fig. 6), then the phase noise
of the leakage contributed by the laser is about 0.1 rad2,
which is much larger than other phase noises in the QKD
system.
Using σle = 2∆t/τc and (A1), Eq.(A2) can be revised
as
εle =
nref∆t
TN0τc
× 10−ξA10 × 10− ξP10 . (A3)
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